Phil Final

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1

Determinism

For any state of the subject, that subject's states are necessitated by the condition of its previous states plus the laws of nature

2

Internalism

objective values must be intrinsically motivating--knowledge of a moral requirement entails bing motivated to follow that requirement

3

Freedom of Wlll

1) capacity of an agent to 2) choose according to her preferences 3) from amongst a set of relevant alternatives such that 4) she is responsible for that choice or action

4

Coercion and Manipulation

makes moral responsibilty and this incompatible

5

Alternate Possibilites

Moral responsibility is incompatible with the fact that the agent could not have done otherwise

6

The Principle of Alternate Possiblities

a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise

7

Frankfurt Jones Cases

The relevant explanation of why someone is responsible concerns the reasons for which they act not whether they could have done otherwise.

8

Leeway Incompatiblism

The truth of determinism is incompatible with an agent's having the capacity to do otherwise than she did

9

Libertarian

yes we have free will there is no determinism

10

Hard Incompatibilism

there is no free will of the kind necessary for moral responsibilty and desert

11

The Source Requirement

If an agent is morally responsibible for her deciding to perform an action then the production of this decision must be something over which the agent has contorl and the agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control

12

Source incompatiblism

The truth of determinism is incompatible wiht the agent's having a casual history of a sort that allows the agent to be the source of her action, thus have th action be under her control in the manner requred for moral respons.

13

Strawson Basic Argument

Nothing can cause itself

in order to be truly morally responsible we must have cause onself in some crucial moral respects

Con: no one can be truly morally responsile

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Crucial respects

character

evaluate disposition and preferences

15

Strawson Revision

1) You do what you do because the way that you are

2) To be Morally respon. for what you do you must be morally responsible in crucial aspects

3) you must have intentionally brought about the way taht you are

4) it is impossible to do this

5) you cannot be morally responsible for what you do because you cannot be morally responsible for the way that you are

16

Valid

D-A

Md-MA

MA-IA

--IA

con:--MA

con:--Md

17

Libet

The role of conscious willing is to control not intiate action

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The efficiacy of concious willing

Not free will, but free won't

19

Libet does not show q

There are no such things as intentions or willing, conscious states are general, there are no proximal willing

20

This afects model penal code--the acusual efficaicy of our concious willing

concious willing and moral responsibilty--this is not enough general conciousness

21

Ethics

What we ought to do

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Metaethics

what we are thinking and doing when we think and talk about what we ought to do

23

Objective Values

Values that give reasons regardelss o fwhat we say do or desire

24

Subjective

values whose reason-giving or prescriptive status depend in some way on what we say/do/desire/think

25

First order--

skeptisicm concerning prevailing moral views

26

second order-metaethical

skeptiscim concerning particular features of morality--moral knowldge truth

27

Noncognitism

Moral language is not descriptive/fact stating-says nothing

pretty musch just an attitude

28

Error Theory

Sematic: Moral Discourse makes descriptive claims but is systematically and uniformly false

Metaphysical:there are no objective moral facts or properties

29

The Argument for Disagreement

1) there is an enormous amount of variation in moral views

2) moral disagreement is intractable in a way that other kinds of disagreement are not

3) the best explanation of intractablity of moral disagreement is that there are no onjective fact of the matter concerning what to do/value

30

Mackie's Reply

Disagreement about moral codes seems to relfect poepl's partication in ways of life

31

The Argument from queerness

If there were objective values/ethical facts they would have to be intrinsically prescriptive or action-guiding

2 Intrinsically action-guiding entities arestrange — they are unlike any other entities that we think exist

3 It is possible to explain ethical behavior without appeal to the existence of such strange entities as objective values/ethical facts 4 ∴ There are no objectively and intrinsically action-guiding

32

Externalism

the motivational force of value is a contingent psychological fact, depending on the psychological structure of an agent

33

Reject For Queerness

Reject premis 1) opt for externalims

34

Reject For Disagreemetn

Premis 1) --moral disagreement is exaggereated

premise 2) moral disagreement is no more or less intractable

35

CAmus position

life is absurd--we have expecations about hte meaning that cannot be met

36

Camus options

!) escape--flase con suicide

2) defiance

37

Nagel on Absurd

Life is absurd when there is a persistent and inescapable mismatch between the aspirations of life and the conditions under which it is lived

38

Bad Arguments for Absurdity of Life

Scale, death, purpose

39

The Purpose Argument

1) life has purpose only if it is a part of some larger purpose or plan

2) there is no larger purpose or plan

3) life has no purpose is absurd

40

Against purpose argument

god,

if one's life has a purose because it brings about x, then we can still ask whether x has a purpose

41

Nagel's Argument for Absurdity

1 Subjectively, we must take our lives and the choices we make as ‘serious’ and non-arbitrary

2 Objectively, we also recognize that our choices are ultimately ‘non-serious’ or arbitrary

3 There is a persistent and inescapable mismatch between the subjective and objective

4) life is absurd

42

absurdity on th ehuman conditon

absurdity requires self relfection

we should deal with absurdity through irony

43

Epistemic Foundationalism

we can divide our knowledge into 'basic' knowledge and the knowledge which is derived from it

44

doubt

We must suspend judgment concerning any proposition whose truth is not known with absolute certainty

45

stages of doubt

Sense-Perception

2 Dreams

3 An all-powerful deceiver

46

Evil Demon Argument

I can sometimes be certain that I am perceiving a material object M only if I can sometimes be certain that M is causing my perceptual experience

2 I can sometimes be certain that M is causing my experience only if it is not the case that any (every) perceptual experience caused by M could be caused in some other manner

3 Any (every) perceptual experience caused by M could be caused in some other manner (e.g. by an evil demon)

4 ∴ I can never be certain that I perceive M

47

the cogito argument

cogito ergo sum--i think therefore i am